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Aging is always present, tailoring our interactions with others and postulating a finite lifespan during which
we are able to exercise them. We consider the prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice, and examine how
quenched age distributions and different aging protocols influence the evolution of cooperation when taking the
life experience and knowledge accumulation into account as time passes. In agreement with previous studies,
we find that a quenched assignment of age to players, introducing heterogeneity to the game, substantially
promotes cooperative behavior. Introduction of aging and subsequent death as a coevolutionary process may
act detrimental on cooperation but enhances it efficiently if the offspring of individuals that have successfully
passed their strategy is considered newborn. We study resulting age distributions of players, and show that the
heterogeneity is vital yet insufficient for explaining the observed differences in cooperator abundance on the
spatial grid. The unexpected increment of cooperation levels can be explained by a dynamical effect that has a
highly selective impact on the propagation of cooperator and defector states.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
If individual interests are in dissonance with the collective
wellbeing a social dilemma is in place [1]. Inherently driven
by the fundamental principles of Darwinian selection, social
dilemmas constitute an intriguing puzzle that can be faced
across the whole of social and natural sciences [2]. Coop-
erative behavior, implying working for the common good of
a society against the innate selfish drive that is routed in each
individual, promises a departure from the impending social
decline. The subtleties of cooperation within groups of selfish
individuals are most frequently investigated within the evolu-
tionary game theory [3, 4, 5, 6]. Particularly the prisoner’s
dilemma game seems best suited to address the issue. In it’s
original form the game consists of two players who have to de-
cide simultaneously whether they want to cooperate or defect.
The dilemma is given by the fact that although mutual cooper-
ation yields the highest collective payoff, individual defectors
will do better if the opponent decides to cooperate. Since self-
ish players are aware of this fact they both decide to defect,
thus constituting overall defection as the Nash equilibrium of
the prisoner’s dilemma game [7]. Prominently, spatial struc-
ture may foster the formation of cooperative clusters on the
grid [8, 9, 10] and thus, depending on the temptation to de-
fect, sustain some fraction of the population in a cooperative
state.
The subject of spatial evolutionary games was extended by
introducing complex networks as the underlying interaction
topology of players [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25], whereby outstanding is the realization that
highly heterogeneous scale-free networks provide a near opti-
mal environment for a flourishing cooperative state [26]. The
important role of heterogeneities within evolutionary games
on complex networks has been additionally amplified by stud-
ies considering participation costs or the usage of normalized
or effective payoffs [27, 28, 29, 30]. Notably, heterogeneities
can also be introduced via differences in the influence and
strategy transfer capability of players [31, 32, 33, 34] or social
diversity [35, 36, 37], whereby the impact on the evolution
of cooperation was found to be similarly beneficial as in the
context of studies considering evolutionary games on complex
network. Recently, however, the focus of research activity
has been shifting towards coevolutionary mechanisms that are
able to generate the heterogeneities necessary for the promo-
tion of cooperation spontaneously. In particular, the aim is not
to introduce the heterogeneities artificially through complex
interaction networks, differences in the strategy transfer capa-
bility or social diversity, but to let them evolve alongside the
main evolutionary process of strategy adoption with coevolu-
tionary rules that, on their own, do not violate the rank of par-
ticipating strategies. For example, in [38] the strategy transfer
capability (or teaching activity) was considered as an evolv-
ing property of players, and it has been shown that simple
coevolutionary rules may lead to highly heterogeneous distri-
butions from an initially non-preferential setup, in turn pro-
moting cooperation in social dilemmas. Moreover, it has re-
cently been shown that highly heterogeneous interaction net-
works may evolve spontaneously from simple coevolutionary
rules [39, 40, 41], and processes like prompt reaction to ad-
verse ties [42, 43] or reputation-based partner choice [44] have
all been considered as coevolutionary rules that can promote
cooperative behavior. Interestingly, mobility may also be con-
sidered as a coevolutionary process, and indeed, recent studies
have shown [45, 46, 47] that it may have a beneficial impact
on the evolution of cooperation. Pioneering in view of intro-
ducing coevolutionary processes to evolutionary game theory
have been works studying the impact of active or dynamical
linking [48, 49], as well as earlier studies considering random
or intentional rewiring procedures [50, 51, 52].
Presently, we study the impact of artificially intro-
duced heterogeneity, and heterogeneities arising from a non-
preferential deterministic aging protocol, on the evolution of
2cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lat-
tice. Alternatively, the deterministic rule for aging can be con-
sidered as a coevolutionary process, during which age as a
property of each player changes alongside the abundance of
the two participating strategies. The two approaches have a
joint root taking explicitly into account the age of participat-
ing players, thus offering a unique constellation enabling us to
investigate differences between artificially and spontaneously
introduced heterogeneities within the context of evolutionary
game theory. Thereby, age as a property, and aging as a pro-
cess, both seem to be very natural ingredients that relevantly
enrich the main evolutionary process of strategy adoption on
the spatial grid. Here it is worth mentioning that the posi-
tive effect of age (and memory-dependent transition rates) on
the consensus formation within the voter model has been de-
scribed recently in [53, 54], and through the spatial effect this
mechanism can help to maintain cooperative behavior.
Since age is often associated with knowledge and wisdom
an individual is able to accumulate over the years, we intro-
duce it to the studied prisoner’s dilemma game through a sim-
ple tunable function that maps age to teaching activity (hence-
forth strategy transfer capability) of the corresponding player.
According to logical reasoning, we consider older players to
be more knowledgable than younger individuals, and the for-
mer are thus also characterized with a higher strategy trans-
fer capability and related reproduction probability [33]. In
case age is assigned artificially (and randomly) to each player
following a uniform distribution and does not evolve in time
(quenched), we find that cooperation promotion depends sig-
nificantly on the level of heterogeneity that is introduced
through the function that maps age to strategy transfer capa-
bility, similarly as reported recently in [35]. However, in case
of the most successful aging protocol, when strategy adoption
is accompanied with the emergence of a newborn, the result-
ing strategy pass capability distribution does not differ rele-
vantly enough from the previously assumed distribution to ex-
plain the enhanced success of the mentioned protocol. As we
will show, the significant improvement of cooperation promo-
tion must be attributed to the details of a microscopic mecha-
nism that promotes the propagation of cooperator and defector
strategies in a highly selective manner. Thus, we report that,
not only may simple coevolutionary rules spontaneously gen-
erate highly heterogeneous states that, on their own, substan-
tially promote cooperation, but may also affect the strategy
adoption process on a player-to-player level, which provides
an additional and unsuspected lift to the cooperative trait.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section we describe the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game and the aging protocols. Section 3 is devoted to the pre-
sentation of results, whereas lastly we summarize and discuss
their implications.
II. GAME DEFINITIONS AND AGING
We consider an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game that
is characterized with the temptation to defect T = b (the high-
est payoff received by a defector if playing against a cooper-
ator), reward for mutual cooperation R = 1, and the punish-
ment for mutual defection P as well as the suckers payoff S
(the lowest payoff received by a cooperator if playing against
a defector) equaling 0. Thereby 1 < b ≤ 2 ensures a proper
payoff ranking and preserves the essential dilemma between
individual profits and welfare of the population for repeated
games [8]. This choice is motivated with the aim of study-
ing a simple and frequently adapted model, but we note that
our findings are robust and can be observed in the full two-
parameter prisoner’s dilemma game as well [55].
Throughout this work each player x on the regular L × L
square lattice is connected to its four nearest neighbors and
initially designated either as a cooperator (sx = C) or defec-
tor (D) with equal probability, and the game is iterated for-
ward in accordance with the Monte Carlo simulation proce-
dure comprising the following elementary steps. First, a ran-
domly selected player x acquires its payoff px by playing the
game with its nearest neighbors. Next, one randomly chosen
neighbor, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff py by play-
ing the game with its four neighbors. Lastly, player x tries
to enforce its strategy sx on player y in accordance with the
probability
W (sx → sy) = wx
1
1 + exp[(py − px)/K]
, (1)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise [9] or its inverse
(1/K) the so-called intensity of selection [56, 57], and wx
characterizes the strategy transfer capability of player x [33].
One full Monte Carlo step involves all players having a chance
to pass their strategies to their neighbors once on average. To
introduce the previously mentioned difference between young
and old players, the strategy transfer capabilitywx is presently
related to the integer age ex = 0, 1, . . . , emax in accordance
with the function wx = (ex/emax)α, where emax = 99, de-
noting the maximal possible age of a player, serves the bound-
ing of wx to the unit interval, and α determines the level of
heterogeneity in the ex → wx mapping. Evidently,α = 0 cor-
responds to the classical (homogeneous) spatial model with
wx = 1 characterizing all players, α = 1 ensures that wx
and ex have the same distribution, whereas values of α ≥ 2
impose a power law distribution of strategy transfer capability
too. We note, however, that at larger values of α the distri-
bution of wx becomes so heterogeneous that the majority of
players is unable to pass their strategy. This may cause frozen
states or extremely long relaxation times. To avoid either of
the two, we choose α = 2 as the highest value in this study.
It is also worth noting that, according to the mapping, larger
values of emax may result in more heterogeneous states than
lower emax (by a given α). Thus, in accordance with previ-
ous findings [35], the borders of b where cooperators survives
may shift higher. However, since other essentials of below
presented results are thereby not affected, and in order to fo-
cus on the new features of the model, we keep emax = 99
constant throughout this work.
Here we separately consider the case where initially all ex
are selected randomly from a uniform distribution within the
interval [0, emax] and do not evolve in time, whereby α de-
termines the level of artificially introduced heterogeneity as
3described. Moreover, we also study the coevolutionary model
incorporating aging, death and newborns. The coevolutionary
aging protocol entails; starting from the same age distribu-
tion as supposed previously, the age of all players is increased
by 1 for each Monte Carlo step (MCS), furthermore, setting
ex = 0 for all players xwhose age exceeded emax (effectively
this means that a newborn follows the dead player). Impor-
tantly, within this coevolutionary model we have studied two
options to handle the age of players that have just adopted a
strategy from one of their neighbors. Either their age may be
left unchanged (coevolutionary model A) or they can be con-
sidered as newborns (coevolutionary model B), i.e. as soon as
player x adopts a strategy its age is set to ex = 0. Notably,
models A and B can be interpreted rather differently. From
a purely biological viewpoint the more successful player re-
places the neighbor with its own offspring, who therefore ini-
tially has a limited strategy transfer capability, which corre-
sponds to model B. On the other hand, especially in social
systems, strategy adoptions may not necessarily involve death
and newborns, but may indicate solely a change of heart, pref-
erence, or way of thinking, whereby this situation corresponds
to model A. Nevertheless, newborns in a social context can
be considered those that changed their strategy recently, and
therefore have a low reputation initially. We will study models
A and B separately, and show that the concept of solely strat-
egy adoption and the seemingly similar reproduction with an
offspring (entailing also the death of the previous player) may
have very different impacts on cooperation within coevolu-
tionary game theory models.
Results of Monte Carlo simulations presented below were
obtained on populations comprising 100 × 100 to 800 × 800
individuals (additional details are provided in the figure cap-
tions), whereby the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC was
determined within 105 to 106 full MCS after sufficiently long
transients were discarded. Moreover, since the coevolutionary
aging process may yield highly heterogeneous distribution of
ex, which may be additionally amplified during the ex → wx
mapping, final results were averaged over up to 20 − 300 in-
dependent runs for each set of parameter values in order to
assure suitable accuracy.
III. RESULTS
We start by presenting results obtained with the quenched
age model, where initially all ex are selected randomly from a
uniform distribution and do not evolve in time. Figure 1 shows
how ρC varies in dependence on the temptation to defect b for
three different values of α. It can be observed that cooper-
ation is promoted more effectively as α increases, which is
in agreement with the fact that α = 0 returns the classical
spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, α = 1 simply copies the
uniform distribution of ex onto wx, and α = 2 transform the
uniform distribution of ex to power law distributed wx with a
slope on a double logarithmic graph equalling−0.5. Since an
increase of α thus directly implies an increase in the hetero-
geneity of players on the spatial grid, these results confirm the
argumentation presented recently in [35]. To further establish
 0
 
 0.2
 
 0.4
 
 0.6
 
 0.8
 
 1
 1   1.02   1.04   1.06   1.08   1.1   1.12   1.14   1.16
ρ C
b
FIG. 1: (color online) Promotion of cooperation due to the increasing
heterogeneity in the ex → wx mapping via α. Stationary fraction of
cooperators ρC is plotted in dependence on b for α = 0 (solid red
line), α = 1 (dashed green line) and α = 2 (dotted blue line). In all
three cases K = 1. The typical system size at this noise level was
L = 400 − 800.
the fact that highly heterogeneous states promote cooperation,
we present in Fig. 2 full b − K phase diagrams for α = 0
[panel (a)] and α = 2 [panel (b)]. Evidently, the promotive
impact prevails across the whole span of K , enhancing not
just the mixed phase region (area between the dashed green
and the solid red line), but also the extend of complete coop-
erator dominance (area below the dashed green line), which is
fully absent in theα = 0 case provided the prisoner’s dilemma
payoff parametrization is considered (b = 1 denoted by the
dashed blue line).
Figure 3 shows Monte Carlo results on the same b − K
phase diagrams as presented in Fig. 2 for the above-mentioned
coevolutionary aging protocols. More precisely, panel (a)
shows results obtained via the coevolutionary model A where
the age of players imitating a strategy remains unchanged,
whereas panel (b) depicts results of model B where players
adopting a new strategy are considered as newborns (their age
becomes ex = 0 as soon as they adopt the new strategy). Al-
though in both cases the mapping from ex to wx is realized
by using α = 2, and the two coevolutionary models seem to
differ only minutely, the models A and B offer very different
levels of support for cooperative behavior. While the coevolu-
tionary model A performs worse than the quenched age model
when using the same α = 2 [for the sake of comparison we
used the same horizontal and vertical scales in Fig. 2(b)], the
coevolutionary model B surpasses its cooperation promotion
abilities markedly. Notice that the level of cooperation can
be enhanced further if the time scales of aging and strategy
adoption are separated [58], for example by letting only 10%
of randomly chosen players (instead of all) increase their age
after each MCS. The phase diagram depicted by dashed green
and dash-dotted red lines in Fig. 3(b) highlights an example
of time scale separation impact on the evolution of coopera-
tion within model B. However, due to extremely sharp phase
transitions (note that for all K > 0.3 the mixed C +D phase
is virtually absent), and long relaxation times associated with
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FIG. 2: (color online) Full b −K phase diagrams for the prisoner’s
dilemma game with quenched uniform distribution of ex, obtained
by setting α = 0 [panel (a)] and α = 2 [panel (b)] in the ex → wx
mapping. Solid green and dotted red lines mark the borders of pure
C (ρC = 1) and D (ρC = 0) phases, respectively, whereas in-
between a mixed phase characterizes the distribution of strategies
on the spatial grid. Dashed blue line at b = 1 denotes the end of
the prisoner’s dilemma payoff parametrization. The phase transition
points were determined using L = 400 − 800.
coevolutionary models that have separated time scales, we re-
strain our analysis to the originally proposed aging protocols
as described in Section 2.
In order to explain the differences in cooperation promo-
tion observed in Fig. 2(b) and Figs. 3(a) and (b) (note that in
all there cases we used α = 2 in the ex → wx mapping), we
examine the probability distributions of resulting age (Q(e))
and corresponding strategy transfer capabilities (Q(w)) due
to the two proposed coevolutionary aging protocols. Figure 4
depicts the obtained results. It is obvious that the coevolu-
tionary model A has the same uniform distribution of ex, and
the corresponding power law distribution of wx for α = 2,
as was also used in the quenched age model in Fig. 2(b). On
the other hand, the coevolutionary model B results in a sub-
stantially more heterogeneous age distribution, which how-
ever, results only in a modestly steeper power law distribution
of wx (see the caption and inset of Fig. 4 for details). Thus,
from the depicted distributions of strategy transfer capabil-
ity alone, one would anticipate that the quenched age model
and the coevolutionary model A would warrant equal promo-
tion of cooperation, whereas only the coevolutionary model
B would perform marginally better. However, neither of the
two statements are very accurate, since in fact model A pro-
motes cooperation worse than the quenched age model, while
model B outperforms both by a significant margin [compare
the corresponding phase diagrams depicted in Fig. 2(b) and
Figs. 3(a) and (b)]. From this we conclude that, although het-
erogeneity arguably plays a crucial role in promoting cooper-
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FIG. 3: (color online) Full b −K phase diagrams for the prisoner’s
dilemma game incorporating aging as a coevolutionary process, ob-
tained by setting α = 2 and considering players who have adopted a
strategy as newborns [model B - their age is set to ex = 0; panel (b)]
or not [model A - ex is unaffected by the strategy adoption; panel
(a)]. Solid green and dotted red lines mark the borders of pure C
(ρC = 1) and D (ρC = 0) phases, respectively, whereas the inter-
mediate region characterizes the coexistence of C and D strategies
on the spatial grid. Additionally, panel (b) features the phase dia-
gram (depicted by dashed green and dash-dotted red lines) obtained
if the time scales of aging and strategy adoption are separated (aging
is 90% slower), whereby the colors of the lines have the same mean-
ing as before [note that C and D symbols are not plotted in panel (b)
to avoid ambiguity]. Dashed blue line has the same meaning as in
Fig. 2.
ation [26, 35] and can evolve spontaneously from strikingly
simple strategy independent aging protocols, coevolutionary
rules may trigger additional mechanisms that work either in
favor or against cooperative behavior yet cannot be detected
effectively by global statistical measures.
Indeed, by closely examining the impact of the coevolution-
ary aging protocols on the microscopic player-to-player level,
thus far hidden secondary mechanisms become visible that
may either hinder (as by model A) or promote (as by model
B) the evolution of cooperation beyond the levels indicated by
heterogeneity alone. For model A the moderate decrease of
cooperation levels, if compared to the quenched age model,
can be explained by the fact that cooperative domains, created
around players with high strategy transfer capabilities, can-
not prevail long. Namely, the central cooperator who built up
the cooperative domain eventually dies, and the arriving new-
born with an accordingly low strategy transfer capability sim-
ply cannot maintain this domain further, thus giving defectors
an opportunity to win it over. However, by the B model the sit-
uation changes significantly because the central players are al-
ways surrounded by newborns. Thereby it is important to note
that whenever an old defector, with a high strategy transfer ca-
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FIG. 4: (color online) Final distributions of age Q(e) for the pris-
oner’s dilemma game incorporating aging as a coevolutionary pro-
cess, obtained by considering players who have adopted a strategy as
newborns (model B; solid red line) or not (model A; dashed green
line; note that the quenched age model is characterized by an identi-
cal uniform distribution). The inset features the distributions of strat-
egy transfer capability Q(w) in the corresponding colors for α = 2.
Note that both axes in the inset have a logarithmic scale, and that thus
the depicted linear dependencies correspond to power law distributed
values of w. Importantly, the slope of a liner function fitted to green
symbols has slope −0.5, whereas the slope for the red symbols is
only marginally higher, equalling −0.7. The employed system size
was L = 200.
pability, is imitated by one of the neighbors, further spreading
of defection is blocked because the newborn defector has no
chance to pass strategy D further. At that time a neighboring
cooperator with high age can strike back and conquer the site
of the newborn defector. As a result the whole procedure starts
again, which ultimately results in a practically blocked (more
precisely an oscillating) front between C and D regions. Cru-
cially, a similar blocking mechanism is not present around old
(and thus influential) cooperators because there cooperator-
cooperator links help newborn cooperators to achieve higher
age, in turn supporting the overall maintenance of cooperative
behavior. This phenomenon is nicely illustrated by the com-
parative snapshots in Fig. 5, where the so-called influential
players with C and D strategies are indicated by blue closed
and black open boxes, respectively. Irrespective of the strat-
egy, a player is designated as being influential if its age ex-
ceeds that of any of its neighbors by at least emax/2 (notably,
qualitatively similar snapshots can be obtained by choosing
different thresholds as well). It can be observed clearly that
influential defectors (blue closed boxes) in the bottom panel
are surrounded by narrow yellow stripes (non-influential de-
fectors), thus reflecting the above-described blocked propa-
gation of defector states. On the other hand, large homoge-
neous white regions indicate that players within cooperative
domains can age together without extinction, and therefore
the age difference between neighbors does not grow perma-
nently. Conversely, the influential defectors in the top panel of
Fig. 5 (coevolutionary model A) don’t experience propagation
restrictions, and accordingly, can easily spread their strategy
FIG. 5: (color online) Snapshots of typical distributions of players
on a 100 × 100 spatial grid, obtained by considering players who
have adopted a strategy as newborns (model B; bottom panel) or not
(model A; top panel). Blue closed and black open boxes depict influ-
ential players (see text for details) in defector and cooperator states,
respectively; while yellow and white are all the other non-influential
defectors and cooperators, respectively. Employed parameter values
for both snapshots are: K = 0.1, b = 1.05 and α = 2.
across the majority of the spatial grid. Notice furthermore that
the overall number of influential player is strikingly larger in
the B model than in the A model. This can be understood by
the frequent strategy changes occurring in the neighborhoods
of defectors.
The above snapshots visualize that aging as an unbiased co-
evolutionary process entailing newborn offspring introduces a
highly selective mechanism favoring the propagation of coop-
6eration at the expense of defection. In other words, the men-
tioned microscopic mechanism enhances the effect of inho-
mogeneities in the strategy transfer capabilities and provides
a substantial boost for the cooperative behavior.
Finally, we mention that non-monotonous mappings be-
tween ex and wx can also be applied successfully within the
proposed model. From the sociological or biological view-
point the model can thus be extended to account for the fact
that the oldest individuals may not necessarily be the most
influential. Keeping the plausible condition that very young
players have no or very little influence, the reduced influence
of very old players is viable as well. For this purpose, we in-
troduced a Gaussian distribution of wx having the maximum
at an intermediate value of ex = 80 with variance σ2 = 350.
If the condition that suppresses the influence of newborns is
fulfilled (their age becomes zero), the observed mechanism
still works exactly as described for the power law distribution.
Nevertheless, as could be anticipated, differences appear in
dependence on the location of the peak as well as the width,
yet they are limited to modest shifts of critical values of b.
We also note that, if the distribution is narrowly centered (e.g.
σ2 = 25) on a given ex (thus, the majority is unable to pass
strategy), the relaxation times become extremely long. For ex-
ample, even at small system sizes (L = 100) MCS = 2· 107
may be a too short relaxation time, and thus one is faced with
the same difficulties as appear if large α are used, as men-
tioned earlier. We thus warn from extensions in this direction
and advise to handle resulting models with care an patience.
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In sum, we have studied the impact of heterogeneities,
motivated by different quenched or evolving ages of play-
ers, on the evolution of cooperation within the prisoner’s
dilemma game on a square lattice. We have established that by
quenched age distributions the enhanced heterogeneities are
advantageous for cooperative behavior. Moreover, we have
shown that simple strategy independent coevolutionary aging
protocols, supplemented by an appropriate function that maps
age to teaching activity, may lead to highly heterogeneous
states from an initially fully non-preferential setup, and thus
significantly elevate the density of cooperators on the spatial
grid. Importantly, however, we have also demonstrated that by
certain coevolutionary rules heterogeneity alone may be an in-
sufficient indicator of the actual cooperation promoting poten-
tial of the environment. In particular, by considering players
who have adopted a strategy as newborns rather than individ-
uals just changing their strategy, a new and powerful mecha-
nism for promotion of cooperation is triggered that acts solely
on the microscopic player-to-player basis, and is thus virtu-
ally non-detectable by statistical methods assessing the het-
erogeneity of the system. The mechanism relies on a highly
selective promotion of cooperator-cooperator and defector-
defector pairs, which hinders influential defectors to spread
their strategy effectively across the spatial grid. As a conse-
quence of the dynamical origin of the observed cooperation-
promoting mechanism, it is expected that it will work in other
cases too, for example when the interaction graph is charac-
terized by a different topology.
Our findings are not restricted to the specific strategy trans-
fer capability profile we generally used throughout this study,
but remain valid for other distributions as well. Specifically,
the distributions need not be monotonous, but may be bell-
shaped with arbitrary skewness as well. The only condition
that needs to be fulfilled is to keep the influence of newborn
and young players at a low level. Evidently, the revealed strat-
egy propagation selection mechanism can work more effec-
tively if the interval of age that maps to low strategy transfer
capabilities is longer.
Presented results outline new ways of promoting coopera-
tive behavior via simple and natural coevolutionary rules that
are able to exploit defector’s weaknesses at the very begin-
nings of their emergence. From the real-life point of view,
our findings support the notion that differences in age alone
may have a beneficial impact on the evolution of coopera-
tion, which might be particularly important for animal and
ancient human societies, where the options for heterogeneities
to emerge through workings made possible by advancements
in technology have been or still are limited.
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